The Decision of the National League of Baseball Clubs to Deny the Purchase and Transfer of a Franchise to a City Not Currently the Home of a Major League Team Is Governed by Section One of the Sherman Act by Judge, Joanne M.
Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 3 
1995 
The Decision of the National League of Baseball Clubs to Deny 
the Purchase and Transfer of a Franchise to a City Not Currently 
the Home of a Major League Team Is Governed by Section One of 
the Sherman Act 
Joanne M. Judge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joanne M. Judge, The Decision of the National League of Baseball Clubs to Deny the Purchase and 
Transfer of a Franchise to a City Not Currently the Home of a Major League Team Is Governed by Section 
One of the Sherman Act, 2 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 189 (1995). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol2/iss2/3 
This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
I. THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF BASEBALL CLUBS
TO DENY THE PURCHASE AND TRANSFER OF A FRANCHISE TO
A CITY NOT CURRENTLY THE HOME OF A MAJOR
LEAGUE TEAM Is GOVERNED BY SECTION ONE OF
THE SHERMAN ACT.
The National League of Baseball Clubs ("National League")
denial of the purchase and relocation of the Philadelphia Phillies
franchise constitutes anticompetitive conduct under section one of
the Sherman Act because the action unreasonably restrains trade.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The National League's
action to restrain interstate commerce is not exempted from the
Sherman Act as a matter of law. Even if certain aspects of profes-
sional baseball have been exempt from the Sherman Act under this
Court's ruling in Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Prof.
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), there is sufficient reason for this
Court to depart from its narrow holding in that case and hold Peti-
tioners subject to the Sherman Act. Therefore, the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit should be
affirmed.
A. The Purchase and Transfer of an Existing Baseball Franchise
Is Not Exempted from the Sherman Act.
A contract to purchase and move a baseball franchise interstate
was not within the scope of activity reviewed by this Court when it
first decided that professional baseball had some exemption from
the Sherman Act. Professional baseball has enjoyed a narrow ex-
emption from the Sherman Act since this Court first held that exhi-
bitions of baseball games "are purely state affairs," lacking the
character of interstate commerce. Id. at 208. When Federal Baseball
was decided, this Court had a narrow view of what constituted inter-
state commerce; a party had to manufacture a product and ship the
product across state lines to be engaged in "trade" or "commerce"
for Sherman Act purposes. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 286
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thirty-one years later, this Court
upheld the exemption "so far as that decision determines that Con-
gress had no intention of including the business of baseball within
the scope of the federal antitrust laws." Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). By the time of the third decision,
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however, this Court directly reversed its opinion on the interstate
commerce issue. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). "Professional
baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate commerce." Id.
at 282.
There can be no question following Flood that professional
baseball is a business engaged in interstate commerce. "[T]he
'sport' of baseball has grown into a $1.5 billion industry with
extraordinary societal and economic dimensions." Julie Dorst,
Franchise Relocation: Reconsidering Major League Baseball's Carte Blanche
Control, 4 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 553, 593 (1994). In the matter
before the court, the contract between the Phoenix Phillies, Inc.
and the Philadelphia National Baseball Club, Inc. ("Philadelphia
Phillies") was for $212 million. (RApp.16). If major league base-
ball was ever a "sport" and not interstate commerce, as Justice
Holmes described it in Federal Basebal4 it has certainly become inter-
state commerce in the intervening seventy-two years, and is, there-
fore, subject to antitrust laws.
Secondly, the reserve clause, which was the basis for the origi-
nal exemption and subsequent affirmances from the antitrust laws,
no longer exists. In Flood, this Court concluded that the reserve
system was a "unique characteristic and need" of the game. Flood,
407 U.S. at 282. The reserve clause system permitted owners to
control player contracts. However, the reserve clause system was
eliminated in 1976 by the Major League Baseball Players' Associa-
tion as a result of collective bargaining and replaced with a free
agency system. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League
Baseball Players'Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). Yet, it was this
reserve system alone that formed the basis for the antitrust exemp-
tion granted to major league baseball in 1922. Federal Baseball, 259
U.S. at 200. "The gravamen of Federal Baseball's case was the al-
leged anticompetitive impact of what is known as the 'reserve
clause' in the early contracts of players in the National and Ameri-
can Leagues." Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 433
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing National League of Prof Baseball Clubs v. Fed-
eral Baseball Club, Inc., 269 F. 681, 687-88 (C.C.D.C. 1920)).
The court below in the case at bar agreed with the limitation of
the exemption to the reserve clause. Chief Judge Landis in the
Court of Appeals noted that "[e]ach case to reach the Supreme
Court from Federal Baseball to Flood has involved the reserve clause."
(R.App.21). "The effect of the Flood decision was to limit the prece-
dential value of Federal Baseball to disputes involving the reserve
clause." (RApp.21) (citing Piazza at 438). Since the reserve clause,
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the basis for the exemption no longer exists, there is no further bar
to the application of the antitrust laws to baseball.
Furthermore, the doctrine of stare decisis should not prohibit
this Court from reversing the statutory exemption granted in Federal
Baseball since the rationale for the decision was reversed by the Flood
Court, and the narrow application that remained for the reserve
clause has now been eliminated. This Court identified four factors
to consider in determining whether departure from the rule of stare
decisis is justified: first, whether the rule has proven to be unwork-
able; second, whether development of the law has left the old rule
an abandoned doctrine; third, whether a special hardship would
result from the consequences of repudiation; and fourth, whether
facts have changed or come to be seen differently so as to have
eliminated justification for the old rule. Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992). Application of
these tests to the case at bar point to the reasons to abandon the
old rule in favor of consistent application of the antitrust laws. The
concept of commerce, antitrust law and the facts that were present
in Federal Baseball have all changed since the 1922 decision so as to
have eliminated justification for the old rule. No special hardship
would result from the reversal since other sports leagues thrive
under the application of Sherman.
Although the doctrine of stare decisis has importance in provid-
ing consistency in the law, this Court has stated that "we cannot
evade our own responsibility for reconsidering, in light of further
experience, the validity of distinctions which this Court has itself
created." Helveringv. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940). The Helver-
ing Court added that prior interpretations of a statute which are no
longer consistent with the statutory purpose nor the Court's own
conception of it should not be bound by stare decisis. Id. This Court
overruled more than eighty decisions of statutory interpretation in
the period from 1961 to 1986.1 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. LJ. 1361, 1368 (1988). It is time for
Federal Baseball to join the ranks of those decisions which this Court
later found to require change. Since F/ood reversed the rationale of
Federal Baseball by holding that professional baseball is interstate
commerce, and free agency has now replaced the reserve system,
1. See, e.g., Welch v. State Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941,
2947-48 (1987) (Federal Employees Liability Act); Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct.
2802, 2809-10 (1987) (Extradition Act); Brown v. Hotel Employees Int'l Union Local
54, 468 U.S. 491, 504-05, 509-10 (1984) (New Jersey Casino Control Act); Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (Sherman Act);
Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (Sherman Act).
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there is no longer any reason or application for the exemption, and
it should be reversed.
B. The Impact of the Exemption of Major League Baseball from
Antitrust Laws Is to Restrain Trade.
Professional baseball's exemption from antitrust scrutiny im-
poses an unreasonable restraint on competition for ownership of
major league professional baseball teams. The Phoenix Phillies
have been prevented from reasonable trade in the relevant market
of competition for ownership of a professional baseball franchise.
"In the antitrust context, the relevant market has two components:
the product market and the geographic market." Los Angeles Memo-
rial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). Here, the relevant geo-
graphic market is the United States and Canada for the product of
ownership of major league baseball franchises.
Since the relevant product market is the market for existing
American League and National League baseball teams, the Phoenix
Phillies are excluded from the total major league baseball market in
North America by the agreement of the National League owners to
preclude them from purchasing one of the available team fran-
chises. This restraint of trade is exactly the type of action that the
Sherman Act was enacted to prevent.
Section one of the Sherman Act prohibits every agreement,
conspiracy, or other concerted activity in restraint of trade. 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The purpose of the agreement
of the fourteen owners of the National League teams is to limit the
number of teams in the League and to control the ownership and
location of each team. This is a restraint of trade which must then
be analyzed, as are most restraints, under the "rule of reason." Stan-
dard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). "Rule of reason" analysis
calls for a thorough investigation of the industry at issue and a bal-
ancing of the arrangement's positive and negative effects on com-
petition. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030,
1050 (9th Cir. 1993). When the balancing test is applied to the
instant case, the negative impact on competition is evident.
The National League is using its exemption to effectively limit
the market for professional baseball franchises, which is not the
purpose for which it was organized or for which the exemption was
granted. The National League was organized in 1876 to enable the
stadium owners to gain control of the teams and the players in or-
der to ensure a return on their investments. (R.App.6). However,
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the National League teams no longer own the stadiums and do not
need that protection. (R.App.6-7). The National League, however,
currently requires that any change of franchise, including the
awarding of a new franchise, be approved by three-quarters of the
fourteen owners in the League. (R.App.14). Therefore, the owner
of a franchise who wants to exclude anyone else from purchasing
an existing franchise or obtaining a new franchise must simply align
with two other owners in the League to veto the acquisition. The
result of this tight control by the current owners of the teams is that
competition for ownership of a team is controlled by the same indi-
viduals with whom the prospective owner would compete for that
ownership. If an individual wants to compete in this market for
ownership of a professional baseball team, permission must be
granted by the competitors.
The competition addressed by the Phoenix Phillies in the case
at bar is not baseball as a competitive sport, but rather, the competi-
tion to own a baseball franchise itself. This means that the relevant
market is the total number of franchises in the United States and
Canada. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 532 n.9 (7th Cir.
1986) (antitrust action brought by jilted suitors of the Chicago Bulls
basketball team stated that the "national sports franchise market
could be a relevant market" for Sherman Act purposes) (dictum).
The competition is for any franchise in North America. The mar-
ket is the totality of available franchises, either through acquisition
or expansion.
"[T]he products being sold in this market (teams) are differ-
ent from those being sold in the exempted markets (games)." Pi-
azza, 831 F. Supp. at 440. "Moreover, anticompetitive conduct
toward those who seek to purchase existing teams has never been
considered by any court to be an essential part of the exhibition of
baseball games." Id. at 441. The Phoenix Phillies are being ex-
cluded from the market for major league baseball franchises by the
anticompetitive conduct of the current owners.
Restraint of trade has been found in other professional sports
where the league attempted to prohibit free marketplace decisions
concerning the relocation of team franchises. In 1984, the Ninth
Circuit looked at a nearly identical issue when the Raiders at-
tempted to move from Oakland to Los Angeles and the National
Football League ("NFL") voted against the move. Los Angeles Memo-
rial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1381. The NFL rules required the same
three-fourths approval of the current team owners as in the case
before this Court. The Ninth Circuit noted: "[e]xclusive territories
1995]
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insulate each team from competition within the NFL market, in es-
sence allowing them to set monopoly prices to the detriment of the
consuming public." Id. The court noted that "[a] basic premise of
the Sherman Act is that regulation of private profit is best left to the
marketplace rather than private agreement." Id. at 1396.
Similarly, the thwarted transfer of the San Francisco Giants
baseball club to St. Petersburg, Florida created the most signifi-
cant and recent challenge to baseball's antitrust exemption. Piazza,
831 F. Supp. at 420. Piazza asserted that Major League Baseball
("MLB") monopolized the market for professional baseball fran-
chises by precluding the sale and transfer of any given team without
League approval. Id. at 430. The Piazza court found that the
Supreme Court construed the Federal Baseball exemption as limited
to the reserve clause and rejected MLB's argument that it is exempt
from antitrust laws. Id.
The effect of the continued baseball exemption is that trade is
restrained. For example, competitive leagues are deterred from
being formed by the League's total control of the minor league sys-
tem; the territorial restrictions imposed to control the broadcast-
ing of games; and the artificial limitation of the number of cities
with access to a major league baseball team. The result is that the
consumer may be harmed without any fear of antitrust liability on
the part of the owners or the league.
The antitrust exemption deters the formation of competitive
leagues because access to the minor league system for player devel-
opment is controlled by the two leagues. Baseball is unique in that
it requires a minor league system to produce the players who are
seasoned and ready to play professional baseball. Minor league
players do not belong to the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion nor any other union and MLB restrains them from entertain-
ing competitive bids for their labor services. Andrew Zimbalist,
Baseball and Billions: A Probing Look Inside the Big Business of Our Na-
tional Pastime, 178 (1992). This is a restraint of trade and no labor
exemption applies. Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Anti-
trust Immunity, 4 Seton HallJ. Sport L. 287, 307 (1994) [hereinafter
Baseball Economics].
The continuation of the reserve system in baseball's minor
leagues makes it nearly impossible for competing leagues to estab-
lish themselves. Id. "[I] n economist's jargon, the minor league re-
serve system is a barrier to entry." Id. Without access to the minor
league players, a third league in baseball does not have a viable
chance to succeed. The exemption, then, deters the formation of
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competitive leagues. Id. Evidence of the deterrent effect is that ma-
jor league baseball has expanded more slowly than other profes-
sional team sport leagues since the 1960's. Id.
Secondly, MLB restrains trade when it imposes territorial re-
strictions on the broadcasting of games. Although the Sports
Broadcasting Act of 1961 allows all professional sports leagues to act
collectively to maximize their revenues in television contracts, MLB
controls the areas which have teams and effectively controls the
market. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). In the future,, it is likely that
MLB itself will centrally program and market on pay-per-view televi-
sion a range of nationally available games. Zimbalist, Baseball Eco-
nomics, supra, at 311. "The existence of territorial rights and MLB's
monopoly marketing of the pay-per-view games, in turn, will in-
crease the purchase price for viewership and further limit the ac-
cess of low and middle-income Americans to enjoy the national
pastime." Id.
In addition, cross ownership ties between team ownership and
television stations now affect more than fifteen teams, which means
that the interests served are narrowed to a few owners of major
franchises rather than the consumers interests. The Tribune Com-
pany, for example, owns the Chicago Cubs, the superstation WGN
(that broadcasts both the Cubs and the White Sox) as well as local
stations that broadcast the games of five additional major league
teams. Id. This gives the Tribune Company tremendous power
within the baseball establishment. Id. The immediate provocation
for Commissioner Vincent's ouster was his decision to realign the
divisions to promote more local rivalries, reduce team travel ex-
pense and permit fans in Cincinnati and Atlanta to see more night
games at normal hours, which provoked the Tribune Company be-
cause it would have put a larger number of WGN's games on after
prime time for most of the nation. The interests of a few owners
are served to the detriment of the consumers, which is exactly con-
trary to the Sherman Act's protection.
Furthermore, the exemption artificially limits the number of
cities which have access to a major league baseball team because it
is in the present owners' best interests to limit the number of divi-
sions for television contract revenues and to keep fan interest high
so that price is not a barrier to attendance and purchase of
franchise materials. "Major League Baseball behaves like a stan-
dard monopoly in restricting supply below the demand for teams
from economically viable cities; that is, it creates an artificial scar-
city." Id. As an example of the interest in attracting a team to its
1995]
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city, there were eighteen ownership groups from around the coun-
try in 1990 who paid one hundred thousand dollars each simply to
apply to be one of the National League's two expansion teams.
David Whitford, Playing Hardball: The High-Stakes Battle for Baseball's
New Franchises (1993). Since team ownership has been separated
from stadium ownership in recent years (R.App.6), Major League
Baseball "can blackmail the cities into bankrolling new stadiums re-
plete with luxury boxes, advertising-friendly electronic scoreboards,
adjacent and abundant parking, and an extensive network of in-
stadium restaurants and concession outlets." Zimbalist, Baseball Eco-
nomics, supra, at 312. This can bring tens of millions of dollars in
additional annual revenue to a team and bring the cities no more
in rental payments. Id. "The cities are being mugged." Id. "There
are enough economically viable cities to support a gradual expan-
sion to forty teams by the year 2004." Id. The current owners have
been able to both suppress the growth and, as in this case, control
the locations of current franchises.
The exemption further acts to harm the consumer without any
fear of antitrust liability on the part of the owners or the leagues by
increasing demand with limited supply and allowing owners to raise
prices without fear of effect on attendance or purchase of logo mer-
chandise. "Many baseball franchises are owned by large corpora-
tions, and, as a result, the business deals of 'baseball's barons' not
only affect hot dog and ticket prices but also larger items such as
the taxes and economic well-being of local communities." Dorst,
supra, at 589 (citing statement of Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, 139
CONG. REc. 2416 (1993)). Senator Metzenbaum noted that MLB
may engage in what otherwise would be labeled as per se antitrust
violations where the owners agree to divide markets and allocate
territories in an effort to maximize their local television broadcast-
ing profits and do so without any fear of antitrust liability. 139
CONG. REC. 2418 (1993). He specifically noted: "baseball owners
have deliberately held down the number of franchises in order to
reap monopoly profits and to maximize their bargaining leverage
with the players and the cities." Id. Thus, consumers are harmed
by both the high cost of participation in professional baseball and
by the tax concessions which the owners can extract from the few
cities with a franchise.
[Vol. II: p. 189
8
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol2/iss2/3
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
C. Congressional Inaction Should Not Deter the Court from
Overturning the Baseball Exemption.
Baseball's exemption was created by this Court, and this Court
should overturn it. This Court has previously relied on the inaction
of Congress to signal agreement with the antitrust exemption for
major league professional baseball. In fact, however, this Court it-
self has described the exemption of baseball from the antitrust laws
as "unrealistic," "inconsistent" and "illogical." (R.App.10) (citing
Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)).
"The Court's reliance upon Congressional inaction disregards
the wisdom of Helvering v. Hallock, . . .'nor does want of specific
Congressional repudiations ... serve as an implied instruction by
Congress to us not to reconsider, in light of new experience...
those decisions . . . .'" Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Helvering, 309 U.S. 106 (1940)). "If Congressional inac-
tion is our guide, we should rely upon the fact that Congress has
refused to enact bills broadly exempting professional sports from
antitrust regulation." Id.
There has been no lack of activity on this issue in Congress.
The Flood Court noted that over fifty bills had been introduced with
respect to major league baseball in the previous twenty years. 407
U.S. at 281. In April of 1976, the House of Representatives passed a
resolution establishing a Select Committee on Professional Sports
("Sisk Committee") to investigate the stability of the country's ma-
jor sports industries. Zimbalist, Baseball Economics, supra, at 319.
The Sisk Committee issued its report on January 3, 1977: "the Com-
mittee has concluded that adequate justification does not exist for
baseball's special exemption from the antitrust laws and that its
exemption should be removed in the context of an overall sports
antitrust reform." Id. The Sisk Committee recommended the es-
tablishment of a successor committee to propose the legislation but
the successor committee was never created. Id.
Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced S. 500, the "Profes-
sional Baseball Reform Act of 1993," which provides that profes-
sional baseball teams and leagues composed of such teams shall be
subject to the antitrust laws. (103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)). Sena-
tor Metzenbaum's bill was defeated in the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee on June 23, 1994, by a vote of 10 to 7. 66 Antitrust & Trade
Regulation Report 736 (June 30, 1994). After the committee meet-
ing, Metzenbaum accused colleagues on both sides of the aisle of
"yielding to pressure from baseball owners." Id. Political pressure
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from the "baseball barons" on the Congress may prevent any action
in the future to correct this inequity in professional sports.
This Court is insulated from the political pressure that para-
lyzes the Congress and is therefore better able to overturn the ex-
emption. The reluctance of Congress to eliminate the antitrust
exemption for baseball may well stem from the fact that baseball is
now controlled by very large and powerful business persons who are
very influential in the political arena. The exemption was granted
by this Court and only this Court is separated from politics in its
ability to reverse that decision.
Justice Douglas said emphatically in his dissent in Flood, "[t] he
unbroken silence of Congress should not prevent us from cor-
recting our mistakes." 407 U.S. at 288 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He
cited Radovich: "[t] here can be no doubt that were we considering
the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we
would hold it to be subject to federal antitrust regulation." 352 U.S.
at 445 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Likewise, Justice Marshall in his dissent in Flood noted that,
"[t] his is a difficult case because we are torn between the principle
of stare decisis and the knowledge that the decisions in Federal Base-
ball [ ] and Toolson [ ] are totally at odds with more recent and bet-
ter reasoned cases." 407 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He
added: "if we re-examine baseball's antitrust exemption [it] re-
quire[s] that we bring baseball within the coverage of antitrust
laws." Id. at 291 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued for the re-
sponsibility of the Court to overturn the exemption it had created
and said, "when our errors deny substantial federal rights, like the
right to compete freely and effectively to the best of one's ability as
guaranteed by the antitrust laws, we must admit our error and cor-
rect it." Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
D. Professional Baseball Must Be Subjected to the Same
Antitrust Standards as All Other Professional Sports in
Order to Prevent Injustice.
The ownership of a professional baseball franchise is no differ-
ent from the ownership of any other professional sports franchise.
"Major League Baseball is the only industry in the United States
that has a blanket exemption from the country's antitrust laws and
is subject to no trade regulation." Zimbalist, Baseball Economics,
supra, at 287. No other professional sport is exempted from anti-
trust laws. The Flood Court specifically listed other professional
sports operating interstate-football, boxing, basketball, and pre-
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sumably, hockey and golf-as not exempt. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283.
Since that decision, a number of other professional and amateur
sports have sought similar antitrust exemptions.2 None have been
granted the exemption, regardless of the basis argued.
More than twenty years ago, this Court recognized that there
was no logic for maintaining the baseball exemption other than
precedent. The Flood Court included in its statements about base-
ball's exemption that "[e]ven though others might regard this as
'unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical,' the aberration is an estab-
lished one." Food, 407 U.S. at 282-84. It is time that Major League
professional baseball is accorded the same treatment under the law
as all other professional sports. Major League professional baseball
should be governed by the antitrust laws of the United States.
II. THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF BASEBALL CLUBS Is NOT A SINGLE
ENTIlY FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION ONE OF THE SHERMAN
ACT.
The clubs that comprise the National League are separate and
independent business entities. (R.App.13). Section one of the
Sherman Act prohibits independent business entities who are mar-
ket competitors from combining or conspiring with other competi-
tors to restrain trade or commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). "It is fundamental in a § 1 violation that there must be at
least two independent business entities accused of combining or
conspiring to restrain trade." San Francisco Seals v. National Hockey
League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Because the Na-
tional League is comprised of fourteen separate legal entities, and
therefore by law not a single entity, the fourteen teams are capable
of combining and conspiring and their actions are not immune
from section one scrutiny.
A. The Form of the National League of Baseball Clubs' Is Not
That of a Single Entity.
This Court, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., set
the standard for multiparty business ventures that would be consid-
ered a single entity for Sherman Act purposes and the National
League fails that test. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The Copperweld Court
2. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1985); Chicago
Prof. Sports Ltd. v. National BasketballAss74 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 13 S.
Ct. 409 (1992); United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335
(2d Cir. 1988); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
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examined "whether the coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary can, in the legal sense contemplated by § 1 of the
Sherman Act, constitute a combination or conspiracy." Id. at 759.
This Court held: "the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for
purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 771.
In order to meet the structural standards of Copperweld, the Na-
tional League would have to "wholly own" the fourteen independ-
ent clubs which comprise the League. As the record indicates, this
is not the case. (R.App.13). Conversely, while the fourteen clubs
"own" the National League, they do not own or control each other.
Either way, under the holding in Coppenweld, the League is not a
single entity. The Copperweld standard applies solely to "wholly uni-
lateral" conduct. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768.
The Copperweld Court's "wholly unilateral conduct" standard
was described as requiring a "complete unity of interest . . .not
unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the con-
trol of a single driver." Id. at 771. This Court noted that both Cop-
perweld and its wholly owned subsidiary, Regal, shared the same
Chairman of the Board/Chief Executive Officer. Id. at 758 n.1.
Thus, the parent company and the wholly owned subsidiary, under
the control of a "single driver," had complete unity of interest.
Under a single source of control, there would be no room for in-
dependent action. Here, the Commissioner of the League is not
the chief executive officer of any of the franchises.
While the "single entity test" need no longer be used for a par-
ent company and its wholly owned subsidiary, it is applicable for
other multiparty business structures. Id. at 772 n.18. Lower courts
have used this test to determine whether multiparty entities had the
requisite complete unity of interest. Id. at 759 n.2.
The single entity test would fail when applied to the National
League because the answers to each question are indicative of in-
dependent entities:
O Do the entities have separate management staffs? Yes,
each club hires its own management staff. Michael S.
Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-
Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 Ind. L.J. 25,
31 (1991).
o Do the entities have separate corporate officers? Yes,
each club is independently owned with separate officers
(under various forms of ownership, such as sole proprie-
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torships, partnerships, limited partnerships and corpo-
rations). (R.App. 13).
0 Do the entities have separate control of their day-to-day
operations? Yes, each club has total control over its
daily operations. Los Angeles Menmrial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
O Do the entities have separate clients? Yes, each club
depends upon the loyalty of their local fans to attend
home games or watch home games on television. This is
how each club generates its independent income.
(R.App.8). Although all clubs do share clients in some
respects since World Series games and All-Star games re-
quire the interest and support of baseball fans in gen-
eral, the fans are primarily associated with their home
teams.
O Do the entities have autonomy in setting policy? Yes,
they have autonomy to set policy for their individual
clubs. Jacobs, supra, at 31. In addition, each one has an
independent vote when the entities set policy together
as teams of the League which establish playing rules,
game schedules and the like. (R.App.13).
Applying these single entity tests to the National League indicates
that while there are some areas of common interest between the
clubs, this common interest falls far short of the complete unity of
interest, "wholly unilateral conduct," standard required for single
entity status under Copperweld.
In an analogous case, the Ninth Circuit held that the NFL was
subject to section one Sherman Act scrutiny based on that League's
structure. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1401. The
NFL's structure is very similar to the structure of the National
League. The Ninth Circuit found the NFL to be "an association of
teams sufficiently independent and competitive with each other,
each possessing independent value." Id. at 1388-89. In addition,
the court found that each franchise had "independent manage-
ment policies regarding coaches, players and management person-
nel .... " Id. at 1390. Thus, the Ninth Circuit found the National
Football League to lack the "wholly unilateral" conduct essential for
single entity status under the Sherman Act. This Court has clearly
stated, "We do not consider under what circumstances, if any, a par-
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ent may be liable for conspiracy with an affiliated corporation it
does not completely own." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767. "Other
combinations ... such as joint ventures [e.g., the League] . . . are
judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power and
market structure designed to assess the combination's actual ef-
fect." Id. at 768. Since the form of the National League fails the
Copperweld standards, it cannot be held to be a single entity.
B. The Financial Practices of the National League of Baseball
Clubs Are Not Those of a Single Entity.
A second important identifying characteristic of a single enter-
prise is the unity of economic interest among all the actors, which is
unlike the member clubs of the National League. "The officers of a
single firm are not separate economic actors, pursuing separate
economic interests .... " Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769. Admittedly,
all of the actors involved in the National League have a common
commitment to make money. This was, in fact, the compelling rea-
son for forming the National League. (R.App.6). But the Cop-
perweld Court "did not decide whether unity of economic interest
can exist in the absence of common ownership." James L. Brock,
Jr., Comment, A Substantive Test for Sherman Act Plurality: Applications
for Professional Sports Leagues, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 999, 1005 (1985).
Nor did this Court decide what to do with an entity that exhibits "a
unity of economic interest with respect to some aspects of their op-
eration, but not with respect to others." Id. at 1007. Yet, if there
are some aspects of the entity in which economic interest is not
shared, there cannot be unity.
In Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., the diftrict court
stated that the economic substance of the association of entities
should be the focus of examination under Copperweld, not just its
form. 856 F. Supp. 990, 997 (E.D. Pa. 1994). "The 'substance' of
the arrangement depends on the economic incentives of the par-
ties." Id. at 998 (citing Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.
1984)). When an individual entity has any economic interest sepa-
rate from the other affiliated entities, the association of affiliated
entities cannot be considered a single entity for antitrust analysis.
Weiss, 745 F.2d at 815. The antitrust concern centers around not
just the separate economic interests of one entity that may be diver-
gent from the other participating entities, but with one entity's in-
terest which may be "out of sync" with the best interests of the
association as a whole. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 912 F.2d 73,
77 (4th Cir. 1990). This antitrust concern highlights the dual pur-
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poses of a National League club owner who must be concerned
with his own profit while also participating in League decisions.
"All professional sports leagues exhibit a dual financial and
decisionmaking structure." Brock, supra, at 1009. The National
League's clubs benefit from the joint revenues that they share. Pro-
ceeds from national media contracts, paraphernalia marketing and
Series' games are divided equally among the teams. (R.App.7).
Yet, revenue sharing in the National League is not as extensive as in
other sports leagues. "Unlike the NFL which shares 90 percent of
its revenues equally, baseball shares only its joint revenues and a
small portion of gate receipts." Y. Shukie Grossman, Note, Antitrust
and Baseball-A League of Their Own, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media
& Ent. L.J. 563 (1993). See also Gary Roberts, On the Scope and Effect
of Baseball's Antitrust Exclusion, 4 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 321, 333
(1994) ("[v]ery low amount of revenue sharing in Major League
Baseball today .... .").
Although the National League clubs share in some joint reve-
nue, "they bear the economic consequences of their individual de-
cisions in gate revenues and operating costs." Brock, supra, at 1009.
Each ball club owner has the sole responsibility for negotiating sta-
dium leases, broadcast rights for home games aired in home terri-
tory and concession sales. North Am. Soccer League v. National Football
League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074
(1982). The individual club owners alone are responsible for capi-
tal expenditures, setting ticket prices, hiring and paying coaches
and players and paying all operating expenses. Id. See also Los Ange-
les Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390. "Thus, in spite of sharing
some revenues, the financial performance of each team . . . does
not, because of the variables in revenues and costs... rise or fall
with that of the others." North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1252.
This is not a description of a single entity with unity of economic
interest. "Coppenveld eliminated the legal fiction of parent-subsidi-
ary conspiracy as a basis of antitrust liability. It should not be ex-
tended to shelter independent actors having diverse economic
interests actingjointly." Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 541
(7th Cir. 1986).
Several legal commentators have urged single entity status for
sports leagues, highlighting the similarity between traditional part-
nerships and the league structure. See Jacobs, supra, at 58 n.10.
While Coppenoeld held that a parent company and its wholly owned
subsidiary were to be treated as a single entity for Sherman Act pur-
poses, this Court earlier held that a partnership was to be regarded
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as a single firm. "The partnership is regarded as a single firm com-
peting with other sellers in the market [as the partners] pool their
capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for
profit." Araona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356
(1982). The key components that make partnerships a single firm
are the same components that would later be delineated in Cap-
perweld: complete unity of economic interest with a single corporate
consciousness. Of course then, these are the same reasons why the
National League cannot be considered a single entity partnership
for Sherman Act purposes.
Under Maricopa, in order for a partnership to be considered a
single entity, the partners must pool their capital. In the National
League, clubs do not pool their capital with each other. In tradi-
tional partnerships, there are common overhead expenses that the
partnership must meet; in the National League, each independent
actor must cover his or her own expenses. North Am. Soccer League,
670 F.2d at 1252. Each club owner, whether as a sole proprietor,
partnership or corporation, must secure independent funding for
its team. Each club owner must meet its payroll, stadium leases and
the like. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390. Individual
clubs' expenses may vary widely. (R.App.8). No other club owner
puts in money to meet another owners' expenses.
In addition, to be considered a single entity partnership, part-
ners must share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for
profit. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356. In Maricopa, a single entity part-
nership was not found to exist as each partner had independent
economic concerns that defeated the necessary economic unity re-
quired for single entity status. Likewise, in the National League,
each club owner shares in the opportunity for part of its profit, but
does not share in the risk of loss. Each club owner's risk of loss is its
own problem. Even when the Phillies were in bankruptcy in 1943,
the other teams did not provide financial assistance; the National
League simply took the team under receivership until a new owner
purchased the franchise. While certain profits are shared, like
pooled television rights, other profits generated are the sole re-
sponsibility of the club owner. (R.App.8). One club owner's bar-
gains and deals do not have a financial impact or implications of
liability on the other club owners. North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d
at 1252. In order to treat the National League as a partnership
then, would require "ignoring the independent personal stakes of
the co-venturers." Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust and the Single En-
tity Theory, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 751 (1989). In the case at bar, the Phila-
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delphia Phillies incremental $22 million profit from advocating for
the Philadelphia Renaissance contract instead of upholding the
original contract made with the Phoenix Phillies belongs solely to
the team owners, and is not shared with the other members of the
National League.
C. The Function of the National League of Baseball Clubs Is
Not That of a Single Entity.
The Copperweld Court taught us to look beyond just the paper
structures that incorporate various forms of enterprises, and this
review indicates that the teams in the National League function like
independent entities. Alongside the paper structures are the func-
tional aspects of entities that will help determine their true nature.
Yet, just as the paper structure of the National League does not
meet the Copperweld standard for single entity status, neither do the
functional aspects match those of a single entity.
The National League functions like a joint venture, which is
not recognized as exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny. The National
League's "sister" leagues, the NFL and the National Basketball Asso-
ciation ("NBA"), have described themselves as joint ventures in
court documents and appearances. "The league [NBA] argues that
the Clippers [club] violated fiduciary duties imposed upon joint
venturers .... ." National Basketball Ass'n v. SDC Basketball Club, 815
F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 960 (1987). The
National Football League in its brief to the Third Circuit stated,
"the members of the NFL are not competitors, but are engaged in a
joint venture in the promotion of an entertainment spectacle."
Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 778 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
The NFL and the NBA are accurate in their self-labeling. "A
joint venture constitutes a business entity separate from its parents
.... At the same time, common ownership of the joint venture
partially unites the economic interests of the parent firms." Joseph
F. Brodley, Joint Venture and Antitrust Policy, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1521,
1525-26 (1982). It is important to remember that the National
League of Baseball Clubs was started by owners of individual teams.
(R.App.6). Sometimes one can almost forget about the past and
think that the National League is the parent corporation and the
individual ball clubs are the alleged subsidiaries. But forgetting
who is the "cart" and who is the "horse" can lead to false cate-
gorizations.
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While joint ventures can attain socially desirable results in effi-
cient ways, they also have the strong potential to raise antitrust
problems "because they distort competitive incentives among in-
dependent firms by making the firms co-owners of a common profit
center." Brodley, supra, at 1524. Brodley has identified three types
of anticompetitive risks prevalent in joint ventures: collusion, loss
of potential competition and market exclusion/access discrimina-
tion. Id.
Collusion and Loss of Potential Competition. Certain joint
ventures have a higher risk of cartelization than others.
Brodley identified three practices which should serve as
warning signs for possible cartelization: requiring close,
continuing cooperation between parents; making the
joint venture the marketing agent for the parents; and,
having parents that are competitors. Id. at 1530-31. The
warning signs are flashing red when these tests are ap-
plied to the National League: the parent clubs are com-
petitors; the National League is the marketing agent for
the parents (R.App.7); and, close cooperation between
the team owners is essential in order to conduct Na-
tional League business and produce "baseball." In addi-
tion, "[p] otential competition between the parents may
be diminished by the same factors that encourage collu-
sion . . . ." Brodley, supra, at 1531.
" Market Exclusion and Access Discrimination. At issue in the
case at bar is ajoint venture's ability to exclude access to
potential competitors. It becomes nearly impossible to
"buy into the closed club of one of the major leagues."
(R.App.7). It is in this respect that the National League
shows its monopolistic character. "IT] he organizational
structure of organized baseball would appear ... to be a
classic monopoly structure of the very sort that the anti-
trust laws of this country were designed to eliminate or
at least regulate." (RApp.8).
Perhaps it is because of these anticompetitive risks that this
Court has found joint ventures susceptible to section one Sherman
Act scrutiny. In Copperwel, this Court specifically said that the sin-
gle entity holding did not apply to joint ventures. Copperneld, 467
U.S. at 768. In Associated Press v. United States, this Court held that
the Associated Press was not a single entity, even though the in-
dependent organizations had to cooperate in their news gathering
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in order for any one of them to have any product to produce. Nec-
essary cooperation between distinct legal entities did not exempt
the Associated Press participants from Sherman Act application.
326 U.S. 1, 22 (1945). "The Sherman Act was specifically intended
to prohibit independent businesses from becoming 'associates' in a
common plan which is bound to reduce their competitors opportu-
nity to buy or sell the things in which the groups compete." Id. at
15. Likewise, in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, this Court
stated:
It is not the form of the combination or the particular
means used but the result to be achieved that the statute
condemns. It is not of importance whether the means
used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in them-
selves lawful or unlawful. Acts done to give effect to the
conspiracy may be in themselves wholly innocent acts. Yet,
if they are part of the sum of the acts which are relied
upon to effectuate the conspiracy which the statute for-
bids, they come within its prohibition. No formal agree-
ment is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy.
Often crimes are a matter of inference deduced from the
acts .... The essential combination or conspiracy in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of deal-
ings or other circumstances as well as in an exchange of
words.
328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946). Lower Federal courts have also held
joint ventures and trade associations subject to Sherman Act scru-
tiny. In McNeil v. National Football League, a district court recently
concluded that portraying the National League as a joint venture
does not exempt it from section one scrutiny. 790 F. Supp. 871, 879
(D. Minn. 1992). Likewise, in Rotheiy Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the single entity de-
fense to a section one Sherman Act violation from a national mov-
ing company and its affiliated local moving companies, noting that
each local company was a "legally separate corporation," and each
company was an "actual or potential competitor" with the national
company. 792 F.2d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1033 (1987).
In a recent case involving a wallpaper retailers' trade associa-
tion, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that
"[t]he actions of a group of competitors, taken in one name, pres-
ent the same potential evils as do the actions of a group of competi-
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tors who have not created a formal organization within which to
operate." Alvord-Polik, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1007
(3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit found that where such associa-
tional organizations exist, the organization's actions are fully sub-
ject to section one scrutiny. The most "straightforward case" of
action that requires section one scrutiny is where the association's
"action is obviously a result of an agreement which is stamped with
the imprimatur of the association by a vote or passage of a resolu-
tion." Id. at 1008. This finding recognizes that separate entities,
even when they combine for a "unity of purpose," are engaged in
concerted action by definition. Id. at 1009. "Because trade associa-
tions are, by definition, organizations of competitors, they automat-
ically satisfy the combination requirements of § 1 of the Sherman
Act." Id. (citing Stephanie W. Kanwit, FTC Enforcement Efforts In-
volving Trade and Professional Associations, 46 Antitrust L.J. 640
(1977)).
Legal commentators have had to change their minds. It was
clear that the "sports-league-as-single-entity" battle was lost. Some
commentators then posed, can you treat leagues as "single entities
for those activities in which they share a preexistent unity of eco-
nomic interest, but not for activities in which the unity is lacking."
Brock, supra, at 1007. See alsoJacobs, supra, at 44; Roberts, supra, at
331. These commentators receive judicial support from District
Judge Williams, the dissenting judge in Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum, who advocates for single entity status for "downstream flow"
activities, and Sherman Act application for "upstream flow" deci-
sions. See generally Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381.
Judge Williams, and each commentator, dissect the leagues'
functions, categorizing them as single-entity (downstream flow) or
plural entity (upstream flow) for Sherman Act purposes. While
these analyses make entertaining reading, they are perpetuating the
myth that sports leagues are unique as business enterprises. "No-
where else in law does the entity depend upon the particular sub-
ject matter that it happens to be considering but not upon its form
or its general function." Jacobs, supra, at 45. As this Court said in
Maricopa, "In unequivocal terms we stated that whatever may be its
peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act... estab-
lishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike." 457 U.S.
at 349.
The concept of dual status for sports leagues becomes even
more perplexing when one looks at the areas that would be labeled
single entity, thus exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny, and those
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that still would be open to Sherman Act application. The recom-
mended areas that would be free from antitrust regulation include:
the Commissioner's salary, Goldman, supra, at 796; the leagues'
rules of play, Brock, supra, at 1026; and joint revenues that do not
impinge on each club's individual potential income. Id. at 1023.
The areas that would be covered under the Sherman Act are the
very areas of past and current litigation involving the leagues: relo-
cation restriction processes, Brock, supra, at 1027; club sales, Id. at
1028; and any decision where the league could be influenced by a
team's individual economic interest. Goldman, supra, at 796. Noth-
ing is gained from this analysis that resolves the controversy in this
case or in the precedents in sports decisions.
D. Even If Single Entity Form, Financial and Functional Barriers
Could Be Ignored, Granting Single Entity Status Would
Create a Negative Precedent.
One can easily be led to believe, by those who feel strongly
about the right for sports leagues to be seen as a single entity, that
consumer welfare is always a direct result of decisions that also en-
hance the single entity league. "[T]he organizational scheme of
the .. . League ... imposes no restraint upon trade or commerce
• . . but rather makes possible a segment of commercial activity
which could hardly exist without it." San Francisco Seals, 379 F.
Supp. at 970. Yet, this Court made it clear in Associated Press that
"arrangements or combinations designed to stifle competition can-
not be immunized by adopting a membership device accomplishing
that purpose." 326 U.S. at 19. It is clear that the "league's interest
and the public interest are not co-extensive." Goldman, supra, at
770.
If sports leagues are single entities, there can be no Sherman
Act section one violation. Therefore, the "rule of reason" analysis,
which serves to protect both the legitimate business needs of the
leagues as well as the consumers, would be inapplicable. "The Rule
of Reason has always given the courts adequate latitude to examine
the substance rather than the form of an arrangement when an-
swering the question . . . within the meaning of § 1." Copperveld,
467 U.S. at 789. As the Second Circuit noted, "if sports leagues are
single entities, league members would escape responsibility for any
restraint entered into by them even though the benefit would be
outweighed by its anticompetitive effects." North Am. Soccer League,
670 F.2d at 1257.
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With single entity status, the will of the league is the way of the
sport. Sadly, past case law has already pointed to glimmers of what
this means (reserve clause), and through case law, the "potent tool"
of restraints against those who "don't play it our way" has been
shown. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
106 (1984); Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Wis.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966). A franchise relocation restriction
could never be questioned, and such horizontal business activity
which might otherwise be per se illegal, is precluded from review
because of the single entity status. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The Antitrust
Implications of Franchise Relocation Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53
Fordham L. Rev. 157, 163 (1984).
"Markets slowly but surely undermine practices that injure con-
sumers." Chicago Prof. Sports, 961 F.2d at 676. The potential for ar-
bitrary or unfair dealing can lead to a parting of the ways between
"America's favorite pastime" and Americans. "[T]he record in this
case emphasizes the existence of a problem.., the defendants gave
little heed to the interest of the Milwaukee community .... There
ought, we think, to be included some provision which would pro-
tect communities, either those who have or hope to have home
teams, from arbitrary and unfair dealing." Milwaukee Braves, 144
N.W.2d at 18.
Beyond deciding the fate of the National League of Baseball
Clubs, the fate of other sports leagues is being determined as well.
As each league is structured similarly to the National League, they
will follow the rules of law set out upon this case. In addition, other
forms of joint ventures, franchisor/franchisee relationships, trade
associations and the like will look for treatment compatible with the
judgment rendered. "Whether a sports league is a single entity for
antitrust purposes has significance far beyond this case .... " Chi-
cago Prof. Sports, 961 F.2d at 673. Neither the National League nor
any other sports league can meet the tests for single entity status
and this Court should find that the National League is not a single
entity.
The Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit based its decision
on two grounds: (1) that organized baseball is no longer immune
from the application of the Sherman Act, and; (2) that the Na-
tional League is not a single entity. (RApp.20-21). This Court
should affirm the Court of Appeals decision for the Phoenix Phil-
lies and overturn baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws and
hold as a matter of law that the National League of Baseball Clubs is
not a single entity.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, the Phoenix Phillies, Inc. respectfully
request that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Twelfth Circuit be affirmed and the case remanded to the
United States District Court for the District of Villanova to award
damages and to grant the injunction requested.
Respectfully submitted,
Joanne M. Judge
Barbara A. Williams
Attorneys for Respondent
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